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THE GLOBAL EXPORTATION OF THE U.S. BAYHDOLE ACT
Thomas J. Siepmann Ph.D.∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

A global experimental analysis of the effect of exportation of the
Bayh-Dole Act (“BDA”)1 reveals the Act’s success. The BDA allows
government funded agencies, such as universities, to retain intellectual
property rights to inventions derived from the fruits of government-funded
research.2 Much of the debate surrounding the enactment and effect of the
Bayh-Dole Act centers on the potential pitfalls the BDA created as
compared to its positive impact on research and the U.S. economy.3 An
international analysis of the exportation of the BDA to other countries
shows that many countries are seeking to imitate the Act because they
desire the positive effects the BDA has had on the United States. This
article aims to step back from the usual U.S.-centered analysis to better
understand the impact of the Act on the U.S. in comparison to other
countries that do not have similar legislation.
As a scientist, I found it helpful to analyze the BDA as a national
experiment in patent law. This article attempts to analyze the effect the
BDA has had on the U.S. as a scientist would analyze the outcome of an
experiment. Imagine a country, such as the U.S., placed into a test tube (a

∗

Currently practicing at TraskBritt, P.C. in Salt Lake City, Utah. The views expressed herein are solely
those of the author and not of TraskBritt, P.C., its employees or affiliates. TraskBritt, P.C. is not
responsible for the views expressed in this article nor did TraskBritt, P.C. sponsor or otherwise cover
any costs associated with this article. J.D., 2004, University of Dayton School of Law; Post-Doctoral
Fellow, 1998-2001, University of Utah, Department of Chemistry,; Ph.D. in biochemistry, 1998,
Medical College of Wisconsin; B.S. in biochemistry, 1992, University of Illinois. The author wishes
to thank his wife, Kimberly, for her loyal support throughout law school, and Professor Gretchen Bender
for bringing her enthusiasm, charisma, inspiration, and encouragement to the University of Dayton and
for her direction in the composition of this article.
1
Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified at 35
U.S.C.A §§ 200-212 (2001)).
2
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
3
For recent publications on the debate, see Diane M. Sidebottom, Updating the Bayh-Dole Act: Keeping
the Federal Government on the Cutting Edge, 30 Pub. Cont. L. J. 225 (Winter 2001) (contending that
the BDA actually increases the evils it was meant to address rather than remove the evils); Peter S. Arno
& Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t we Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and
Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part
From Federally Funded Research, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (2001) (citing abuses of the BDA and the
negative costs it inflicts); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research And Private Development: Patents
And Technology Transfer In Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996) (stating
many oppositions to the theoretical premise of the BDA itself); Mark G. Bloom, University Licensing:
Past, Present and Into the New Millennium, in 2002 Licensing Update § 7.06 (Gregory J. Battersby &
Charles W. Grimes eds., Aspen Law & Business, 2002) (contending that the BDA is largely responsible
for creating the competitive edge the US now enjoys in the intellectual property market).
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really big test tube) as the test subject, and an experimental variable, such
as the BDA, delivered to the test tube. Then imagine watching through the
test tube glass to see what changes take place. What instruments would one
use to measure these changes? What physical properties of the test subject
would be measured or measurable? The goal of this discussion is to pull
together observed changes taking place inside the test tube upon addition of
this variable and, hopefully, to come to some clear conclusions regarding its
effect. In addition, a purpose is to make predictions about what effect such
legislation may have elsewhere in the world, on other test subjects, such as
Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.), or Italy.
The BDA was enacted to address a specific intellectual property
problem. Problems have existed in the multi-billion dollar national public
research arena4 since the U.S. government began funding basic research.
Though some discoveries made by U.S. government laboratories were
patented, the opportunity to exploit intellectual property gains from
government funded research was largely ignored by private industry before
the BDA was enacted.5 The parties involved - the U.S. government,
universities6 and private industry - expressed a long-felt need to make new
discoveries generated in government funded research projects more
accessible. The legislators’ hypothesis7 could be summarized as follows:
passage of the BDA will accelerate technology growth in the U.S. and
allow the government to capitalize on research discoveries through
commercial exploitation. The center of many scholarly and political
debates is the question: has the BDA actually fixed what was thought to be
“broken”?8
The scientific method espouses to provide objective answers to
problems through logically-designed experiments.9 In the 13th century,

4

The magnitude of the U.S. research budget is billions of dollars. Total research expenditures by 66
U.S. universities, hospitals, and non-profit research institutes were $15.7 billion. The U.S. spent $18.1
billion in Fiscal Year 2000 on research. Assn. of U. Tech. Managers, AUTM Licensing Survey: FY
2000: A Survey Summary of Technology Licensing (and Related Performance for U.S. and Canadian
Academic and Nonprofit Institutions and Patent Management Firms), 6 (Lori Pressman ed., 10th
Anniversary
ed.,
Assn.
of
U.
Tech.
Managers,
Inc.
2002)
(available
at
http://www.provendis.info/home/downs/AUTMFY2000Survey.pdf) [hereinafter AUTM FY 2000
Survey].
5
Bloom, supra n. 3, at 209.
6
The term “university” is meant to connote all institutions of higher education including non-profit
institutions that regularly perform basic science research.
7
In scientific lingo, a “hypothesis” is a premise the researcher hopes to be true. Scientists are trained to
be objective observers and thus, though they may be emotionally invested (and in some circumstances
financially invested) in a particular outcome, their task is to design an experiment that either proves or
disproves the hypothesis in such a way that leaves no question or doubt to their peers, who may be
equally emotionally and financially invested in the exact opposite hypothesis.
8
See Eisenberg, supra n. 3, at 1663-71.
9
There are many ways to define the scientific method. One definition includes the following steps: “1)
observe some aspect of the universe, 2) invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol30/iss2/2

2004]

THE U.S. BAYH-DOLE ACT

211

Roger Bacon championed Aristotle’s method of logical induction. Later, in
the 17th century this method was further expanded and developed by such
scientific forefathers as Francis Bacon.10 The method, as originally
developed, involved a repetitious cycle of observation, hypothesis and
experimentation with independent verification. The essential elements of
the scientific method, used in various forms in laboratories throughout the
world, consist generally of: observation; hypothesis; design of a test
(logically predict results and perform experiment); formulate a conclusion
based on the data; and, finally, develop a new hypothesis (it is a seemingly
never-ending process). Scientific papers published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals11 generally mirror this process. Scientific publications
usually contain an introduction revealing everything currently known to be
true about the subject, a materials and methods section describing in detail
the conditions under which experiments were performed, a results section
providing detailed data given by the experiments, and a conclusion that
attempts to filter this data through current state-of-the-art knowledge of the
field.
Here, the scientific method is applied in an attempt to provide a
new view of the problem legislators faced at the time the BDA was enacted
and new insight into its effects both on a national and global scale. Thus,
this article deviates from the normal law review format as follows. The
Introduction contains the experimental conditions.
This section is
somewhat more detailed due to the complex nature of the subject:
describing the status of a country’s public research system. While
individual reports contain this information for each country, to date there is
apparently no comprehensive review published in a single article. Thus, the
Introduction consists of a brief description of the experimental sample (the
U.S. economy just prior to enactment – the object of observation) into
which the BDA (the experimental variable) is introduced. Every good
experiment needs control samples, preferably in triplicate.12 The samples

consistent with what you have observed, 3) use the hypothesis to make predictions, 4) test those
predictions by experiments or further observations and modify the hypothesis in the light of your results,
5) repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between theory and experiment and/or
observation.”
Jose
Wudka,
The
Scientific
Method,
http://phyun5.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node6.html# SECTION02121000000000000000
(accessed April 6, 2003).
10
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia, Scientific Method, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
(accessed February 9, 2004).
11
For instance, Journal of Biological Chemistry, Journal of Molecular Biology, Journal of the American
Chemical Society, etc.
12
In science there are positive and negative controls which must be run in every experiment to allow for
subtraction of background and to ensure the experiment is actually working as designed. A negative
control sample, in scientific lingo, refers to a sample run in parallel with the experimental sample, under
identical conditions in all respects except the control is devoid of the experimental variable. For
instance, if one were measuring the conversion of a molecule by an enzyme from substrate to product,
the negative control sample would not contain any enzyme (to measure the background rate of
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are countries, each country with its own legal framework, representing a
unique sample. The introduction describes these controls. The negative
control samples (also countries) include all other developed countries
around the world that do not have similar legislation, but otherwise have
political, economic, social, and industrial conditions similar to or on par
with the U.S. For the purposes of this article, the current conditions in
several European countries, to a first approximation, constitute good
negative control samples. The positive control sample is a theoretical
country in which the public research system has no problems translating
discoveries into innovations that immediately benefit the public.
Section II describes enactment of the BDA, its goals and objectives,
its language, and its basic operation. Section III discusses both quantitative
and qualitative outcomes about the positive and negative effects enactment
that the BDA has yielded. Section IV summarizes these observations into a
single, coherent conclusion by considering the controls and comparing them
to the U.S. experiment. The BDA continues to have a significant and
valuable effect on the U.S. economy. Without the BDA, the U.S. would not
be the world leader in biotechnology, nor in any other area of technology,
that it is today.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Description of the U.S. System & Control Systems

Scientific publications usually include an introduction describing
all relevant generally accepted knowledge published within their specific
field of study. This introduction includes a brief description of the system
and the current knowledge commonly believed to be true or proven
regarding pertinent aspects of the public research system. In this study, the
U.S. represents the experimental sample. To describe this sample, various
interactions are summarized, including: the genesis of government funded
research and its spread to universities, the interaction between universities
and private industry, and the interaction between government laboratories
and private industry. Though the parties may interact for varying reasons
and purposes, the motivational force at the heart of these interactions is
acquisition of money and patents. A full description of the U.S. system
requires a brief review of the foundations of the U.S. patent system and the
condition of the U.S. system just prior to BDA enactment.

conversion without enzyme present). With this control, the scientist can more accurately determine how
much of the conversion is directly attributable to the experimental variable, the enzyme, and not some
other unknown variable. There are also positive controls – controls in which the event being measured
is pushed to its maximum, e.g. in our hypothetical, a system in which the molecule is completely
converted through addition of excess enzyme to the sample. This allows the scientist to affirm that the
method of detection is working properly.
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A detailed description of the control samples (foreign countries)
follows the description of the U.S. sample. This later section is further
divided into controls that give property rights to the universities, and those
that do not. These individual sections are broken down by country. Of
course, every country in the world cannot be analyzed since data is
available for only a few of the countries within the global system. As in
most experiments, to simplify the outcomes and conclusions, only a part or
subset of the total system is examined. The countries analyzed generally
compare in development to the U.S.
1.

The Experimental Sample: The U.S. Condition Prior to the BDA

Knowledge was, and still is, considered a source of power to the
underclass; a means to achieving a way of life better than that given to
them. Since the Venetian patent system was established in the 15th century,
economically developed societies placed a high value on pursuit of
knowledge and the fruits of those efforts.13 Throughout early science, only
private, wealthy citizens had the time and the resources to pursue science
and philosophy. During this time in history, Kings and Queens granted
patents, or monopolies, to noblemen of their choosing to enforce throughout
their land in whatever manner they sought fit (which often caused much
consternation among governing bodies).14 However, in the 13th century,
public and private universities and colleges were established in such places
as Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Bologna, Padua, and Montpellier.15 These
institutions were capable of teaching many students and funded their own
research. At these higher educational institutions, non-aristocratic, middle,
and lower class citizens could pursue whatever field of interest caught their

13

There is debate surrounding the emergence of the very first patent system and in which country it
arose. A majority of historians subscribe to the view that the Venetian Act of 1474 was the first patent
legislation enacted in the world. This Act stemmed from the guild system, circa 1300, which allowed
policing of various crafts and industries within Venice. The alternative view, the “Tyrolean View,”
expressed by Professor Erich Kaufer, is that modern patent systems can be traced to Germanic roots in
which patents to Waserkünste, or water mines, were enforced by the “Constitutiones Juris Metallici”
enacted by King Wenceslaus II in 1300. Both views point to the same year for the inception of a patent
ideology. Erich Kaufer, The Economics of the Patent System, in Fundamentals of Pure and Applied
Economics 1, 4 (J. Lesourne and H. Sonnenschein eds., Routledge 2001).
14
Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: an Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52
Hastings L. J. 1255, 1259-66 (August 2001); see Kaufer, supra n. 13, at 6.
15
The reader may consider Plato’s “Academy,” established in 399 B.C., as the first university. Though
physiology, anatomy, mechanics, and astronomy were studied as early as 500 B.C., it is not until the
early 13th century that the studies began to form into the modern defined fields of chemistry, physics,
medicine, biology, etc. The inductive/deductive (Francis Bacon v. René Descartes, respectively)
method debate occurred in the early 17th century. In the middle of that century, scientific societies such
as the Royal Society of London and the Paris Academy of Sciences were formed. Questions about
ownership of scientific inventions did not really arise until late in the 19th century, when science-based
technology began to become useful in industry (industrial revolution). Erich Kaufer, The Incentives to
Innovate Under Alternative Property Rights Assignments with Special Reference to the Patent System, in
The New Institutional Economics 233, 237 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Rudolf Richter eds., Texas A&M
University Press 1991).
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attention, so long as they displayed enough intellectual acumen to gain the
confidence of university administrators and fellow colleagues.
The division between academia and industry is long and deep.
Historically, any potential industrial applications of scientific discoveries
made within academia were deemed public knowledge and, therefore, not
protected by patents.16 An invisible wall seemed to exist between industry
and academia, preventing their interaction throughout most of early
scientific development. One scholar remarked that “[i]f modern science is
seen as having been born around 1600 A.D., then ‘for an amazingly long
time advances in science and progress in the practical arts ran parallel, with
few interconnecting ties.’”17 This dichotomy of an independent academic
development, alongside a private industry that benefited from this
development, presents special problems. The evolution of an industrial
society increasingly benefited financially from innovations and discoveries
made at the universities. Universities, however, gained no tangible or
financial benefits other than perhaps increased enrollment or better quality
teachers if the publications were well regarded and respected by scientific
peers. Unfortunately, in some cases, scientific discoveries were left unused
and unapplied.18
U.S. funding of private industry projects had its genesis during
World War II. Efforts to win the war led the U.S. government to the
realization that private industry had to be tapped to provide the necessary
resources. After the war, U.S. leadership announced a different kind of war
- a war against disease. The U.S. government realized that it also lacked
the capacity to complete the research required to win this war alone. Thus
began the era of government funded research within institutions of higher
education and other non-profit organizations.19 A brief chronological
overview of this development follows.
In 1950, for the first time in U.S. history, Congress created and
funded a government agency for the sole purpose of conducting scientific

16
Research efforts and discoveries of scientists are regularly published in scientific journals with worldwide circulation for all to read as part of the “publish-or-perish” paradigm tacitly enforced in most
universities. Though protected by U.S. copyright laws, these publications are and have been for
centuries, a rich, crucial source of intellectual work culled for scientific techniques and ideas to be
practiced and explored in a laboratory setting. Public disclosure of these ideas and techniques precludes
patent protection under U.S. patent law, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which states that no intellectual property
disclosed to the public 12 months prior to application for patent is patentable. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2004).
17
Kaufer, supra n. 15, at 237 (citing J. Conant, Science and Common Sense, pinpoint reference, (New
Haven, 1951)).
18
Ted Agres, Euros for Discoveries? European Scientists Follow Their US Counterparts to the Market,
http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2002/apr/prof1_020429.html (accessed April 29, 2002).
19
Bloom, supra n. 3, at 209.
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research.20 At that time, there were no statutory provisions outlining the
disposition of property rights to innovations created in government funded
research laboratories. Some agencies experimented with Institutional
Patent Agreements (“IPA”s) but they were “fraught with restrictive
provisions that . . . [made it] unworkable . . . for transferring technology to
the private sector.”21 Prior to the passage of the BDA, IPA’s were the only
contracts available to private industry groups seeking access to inventions
arising from government funding.22 Every government agency and
university had their own unique rules regarding ownership of the property
rights to these inventions. Often these rules varied from agency to agency
and from university to university, presenting private industry with a
confusing and inconsistent landscape of rules and regulations.23
Some private companies, apparently motivated by the deep pockets
of government funding, were nonetheless willing to navigate the labyrinth
of rules and regulations.24 Additionally, several universities, such as the
University of California, Iowa State, and the University of WisconsinMadison, patented inventions for profit before the BDA was enacted.25
This activity represented only a small fraction of the total utilization
theoretically possible. At that time, the federal government accumulated
over 30,000 patents, only 5% of which were actually licensed. An even
smaller fraction of patents were commercially exploited.26 Harbridge
House produced a study in 1968 concluding that contractor-held inventions
were 10.7 times more likely to be utilized commercially than government
inventions.27 As Mark Bloom, Manager of Licensing and patent attorney at
the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, succinctly states, the feeling was that
“what is available to everyone is of interest to no one.”28
In 1963, President Kennedy issued a memorandum that essentially
re-affirmed “that the rights to publicly funded, health-related inventions
should remain in the government.”29 In 1965 and 1971, Science Advisors
to the President recommended the varied and inconsistent policies be
consolidated into a more uniform policy, enabling efficient use of

20

Id.
Id. at 213.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 209; Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 656 (citing Sen. Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Patent Policy: Hearings on S.1215, 96th Cong. 216, 220 (1979).
24
Sidebottom, supra n. 3, at 234.
25
Bloom, supra n. 3, at 209.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 211 (citing Harbridge House, Inc., Government Patent Policy Study for the FCST Committee on
Government Patent Policy, Vol. II, Parts II and III (May 15, 1968).
28
Bloom, supra n. 3, at 211.
29
See Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 642 (citing Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies) (Government Patent Policy); see also 3 C.F.R. § 861 (1963).
21
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intellectual property stemming from government funded research.30
Scholars who closely examined the legislative history behind the BDA
concluded “the legislative history is replete with claims that granting title,
as opposed to a mere license, to federal contractors would speed and
enhance technological progress.”31
The BDA was not built in a day or even in a year. There was at
least one middle step between chaos and uniformity in the public research
system. A predecessor to the BDA, “[t]he Stevenson-Wydler Act made
technology transfer a mission of government-owned, contractor-operated
laboratories.”32
This Act required all federal government funded
laboratories to establish a technology transfer office to aid private industry
in the translation of research outcomes to commercially viable uses.33 This
Act, however, was largely considered ineffective and was later amended by
more robust legislation.34
Following passage of the BDA, several additional pieces of
legislation expanded upon the same theme. For instance, the Federal
Technology Transfer Act (“FTTA”), which was an amendment to the
“failed” Stevenson-Wydler Act, stated that continued support of federal
funding of basic science research was critical.35 It contended that the
government should not compete with the private market in exploitation of
inventions created through government funding. Further, the FTTA
encouraged enactment of legislation providing incentives to motivate the
translation of these innovations to private industry.36 More significantly,
the FTTA expanded the original coverage of the BDA to include businesses
of all sizes.37 The FTTA created the ability of government funded
laboratories to enter into wholly new arrangements called Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (“CRADA”). CRADAs allow
government funded research administrators to enter into licensing
agreements or assign rights to patents arising from the contracted work to
any contracting party. Administrators of these research programs, through

30

See Bloom, supra n. 3, at 211-12 (citing 28 Fed. Reg. 200 (October 12, 1963); see also 66 Fed. Reg.
166 (August 26, 1971).
31
See Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 693 n. 11 (citing H.R. Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the
House Comm. on Sci. & Tech., Government Patent Policy, 96th Cong. 4-5 (1979); see also Sen. Rpt.
No. 96-480, 27-30, at 16 (1979).
32
See Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 643 (discussing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3717 (West 1998)).
33
Id.
34
Id. “Translation” refers to the process of transfer of potentially commercially useful scientific
discoveries made within the academic environment to the public, either through utilization by private
industry or release into the public domain.
35
Id.
36
Bloom, supra n. 3, at 222 (see generally Federal Technology Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100
Stat. 1785 (1986)).
37
Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the Hopkins v. CellPro
March-in Rights Controversy, 8 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 211, 214 (2000).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol30/iss2/2

2004]

THE U.S. BAYH-DOLE ACT

217

the FTTA, are required to share royalties with researchers directly involved
in creation of the subject matter behind the patent.38 The BDA was
amended only in minor aspects, including an expansion applying the BDA
provisions to all contractors, regardless of their size or status.39
Meanwhile, as a backdrop to these legislative efforts, historically
significant changes were occurring within the judicial branch.
A
groundbreaking case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1980.40 In this case, the Supreme Court held that current
U.S. patent laws, founded on Article I of the U.S. Constitution, did not
preclude the patenting of living organisms.41 The organisms in question
were bacteria engineered with specific enzymes able to digest oil
byproducts.42 The patent had method claims of making and using the
bacteria, but also contained a claim encompassing the newly created
bacterial strain.43 The Supreme Court essentially held that the invention
was consistent with the plain meaning of the description of “patentable
material” provided by 35 U.S.C. § 101.44 Additionally, the Court held that
it was the legislature’s role, not the judiciary’s role, to determine the limits
and bounds of what was patentable.45 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s
prediction, this decision contributed to the creation of the strongest
biotechnology industry in the world: the U.S. biotechnology empire.46
Moreover, in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created
specifically to handle patent and other intellectual property concerns.47
Many scholars feel this altered the tides in the public’s perception that
patents were “evil” because they granted monopolies to private industry.48
2.

The Control Samples: European Country Conditions as Negative
Controls
Descriptions of the negative control samples (foreign countries) are

38

Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 644 (discussing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3714 (West 1998)).
See Sidebottom, supra n. 3, at 228 (citing Ronald Reagan, Government Patent Policy, 1983 Pub.
Papers 1, 248).
40
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
41
Id. at 318.
42
Id. at 305.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 318.
45
Id.
46
David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, & Arvids A. Ziedonis, The Growth of
Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980, http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/RESEARCH/Paper/99-7.pdf (accessed Nov. 12, 2004). The
authors state that “[a]n earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on ‘The U.S. and
Japanese Research Systems,’ Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, September 10-12,
1998.” Id.
47
Id.
48
Valoir, supra n. 37, at 212.
39
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provided to better contrast the status of the negative control with that of the
U.S. experimental sample after introduction of the BDA. These countries
are considered negative control samples because, to a first approximation,
these countries are similarly developed and, until very recently, lacked any
legislation resembling the BDA. These countries had access to the same
technology, experienced similar standards of living, were governed by
similar political systems, and actively and substantially funded government
research projects (although not to the same extent as the U.S.).
Additionally, to a first approximation, the subject matter protected by
patent, copyright, and trademark in the U.S. is also protected in Europe
(with some exceptions).
There are some substantive differences, however, between the U.S.
experimental sample and the negative control samples. Many European
academic researchers are only hesitantly, if at all, interested in the
exploitation of their research in the private sector.49 Due to the limited
number of positions in most European nations’ academic institutions and
the extremely competitive nature of their system, many European
researchers rightly fear any potential negative fallout stemming from failed
inventions or discoveries that can potentially harm the public.50 While this
is also true in the U.S., such fallouts appear to be more tolerated since in the
U.S. there are many more universities and laboratories conducting research
and in need of scientific expertise.51 Additionally, in contrast to most
European Union (“EU”) countries, the U.S. has no price control measures
in place to control the amount of money private industry can charge on
prescription drugs (regardless of whether drug development occurred
collaboratively with government entities).52 Logically, it is anticipated that
markets lacking price control lead to more profits than those in which prices
are tightly regulated and tied directly to cost. Therefore, the potential for
better-than-average profit may stimulate additional investment from the
private sector. Also, while the U.K. has had much success in their public
research system without a BDA-like set of laws, their laws did clearly
allocate ownership rights to such inventions.53 In the U.S., however, prior
to enactment of the BDA, it was entirely unclear who owned the rights to
inventions funded by public monies.54 The clarification provided by the
U.K. system allowed for a more efficient exploitation of inventions than

49

Agres, supra n. 18, at ¶15.
Id.
51
See infra n. 196 and accompanying text.
52
Arno & Davis, supra n. 3, at 633.
53
Royal Society: The National Academies Policy Advisory Group, Intellectual Property & the
Academic Community, 36 (available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=5772) (last
updated March 1995).
54
Eisenberg, supra, n. 3, at 1671.
50
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that which may have occurred without it.55
Other considerations include the high cost in many countries of
prosecuting patents and the weak intellectual property laws that govern
them. Many European governments and leaders continue to express the
dire need for a community-wide, perhaps even world-wide, patent system to
help decrease costs of prosecution.56 The combination of weak intellectual
property laws and expensive patent prosecution can be fatal to a country’s
intellectual property regime, as is the case in Spain.57 The EU condenses all
these problems into the following list of concerns58:
Poor EU performance could be explained by the culture of
many EU research institutions. Problems cited included:
•

a continued over-reliance on a ‘linear’ approach
to innovation, which assumed that investment in
the supply side would automatically result in
marketable innovations downstream;

•

measuring academic success on the basis of
research papers or academic citations, with
intellectual property creation, for example, often
not given parity of esteem as a research
publication;

•

peer review (and lack of external examination),
which may tend to prevent academic networks
opening up to external scrutiny; and

•

academics being given insufficient time, or
promotion incentives to engage in commercial
activities.

The EU is vocal and specific in calling for reform of the research
systems within its member nations and cites a litany of problems from
“poor knowledge transfer mechanisms from the science base to industry,”
to “significant barriers” within the academic culture itself that prevent
commercialization.59 The EU also cites an overall lack of clarity among
many member nations as to who actually owns intellectual property
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stemming from government funded research.60 If legal scholars cannot
interpret the laws surrounding intellectual property in this context, it is
unlikely that scientists can either. The EU specifically recommends that
“increased use of procurement for public research could facilitate
contracting within and between public and private sectors,” and that
establishment of “national procurement programmes” (sic) could lead to
community-wide benefits of increased economic potential stemming from a
robust research industry.61
The variety of country responses to the problems in existence today
creates a confusing morass of indefinite rights. This current European
condition is similar in many respects to the condition of the U.S. prior to
enactment of the BDA (circa 1970-1980). The summary below serves to
describe the current condition of the negative control group.
a.

Negative Control Samples: Countries that Grant Intellectual
Property Rights to the Universities

A review of the current conditions of a few countries in Europe
serves to better describe the negative control sample group. Several
countries appear to be following in the footsteps of the U.S. by enacting
very similar legislation, such as the United Kingdom (“UK”), Germany,
and Denmark.62 The UK has long been revered as a research powerhouse
in Europe and continues to improve on its already impressive track record
for translation of academic research to industrial use. Germany recently
passed new legislation that generally effectuates BDA provisions.63
Belgium has research institutes blazing new paths in licensing and is
establishing cooperative agreements and partnerships between industry and
academia.64 Other countries are implementing similar plans but with
different variations including funding of private/public organizations to
oversee the translation of academic research into industry.65 The remainder
of this section is devoted to a more detailed analysis of the current
conditions of these countries.
i.

The United Kingdom
According to the UK Patent Act of 1977, which is similar to the
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U.S., academic researchers in the UK are technically employees of the
university at which they work.66 Therefore, patent rights stemming from
research results within that employment relationship belong to the
university. As the Royal Society described the situation in its review of the
current UK patent system, “[v]arious royalty sharing schemes now operate
in universities: a common pattern is for all or a very high proportion of
initial returns to go to the inventor(s); with larger proportions thereafter
going to the institution, sometimes with a further tranche for the department
concerned.”67 Most universities apparently have agreements with students since students are not technically considered employees - that stipulate
ownership of property rights to be held by the university with a share of the
royalties going to the student. The Royal Society in general agrees with
this approach for the optimal use and exploitation of discoveries while
preventing them from being “taken off surreptitiously to the private
sector.”68
An analysis of the revenues gained from this legislative backdrop
reveals very positive impacts for the UK. In 2001, the Medical Research
Council (“MRC”) realized £9.6 million due to licensing of its inventions.69
In 2002, it was predicted that this would increase from £10 to £12 million.70
Along with the usual exploitation of intellectual property, the MRC
generated 16 new start-up companies, established a venture capital fund,
and has over 330 licensing agreements on their books.71 In addition, the
UK Patent Office, in a collaborative project with the Association of
University Research and Industry Links, is working to make university
technology more accessible to the European community by creating a web
site that will contain a database of patents held and available for license to
industry.72 The EU noted this change along with the UK’s increase in
establishment of research and technology organizations and “[g]overnment
support for building links between universities and industry,” but felt the
country still needed improvement due to non-uniformity among universities
and their handling of intellectual property rights.73 Thus, the situation in
the UK mirrors that in the U.S. to a degree, resulting in some favorable
outcomes for the UK economy, in contrast with different conditions found
in other countries.
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Germany

In Germany, enactment on January 18, 2002, of an amendment to
the German Employed Inventor’s Act revoked the long-standing privilege
for employees of universities, such that a university now can lay claim to
inventions created by its employees with government funding on its
campus.74 Prior to the amendment, many believed this privilege stifled
commercialization of inventions made in academic institutions.75 The
amendment stipulates that employees must receive 30% of the profits
stemming from the commercialization of their discovery.76 The new
provisions of section 42 of this Act, in summary, hold that: 1) inventors are
allowed to publish their inventions so long as they give their employing
institution a two month notice prior to publication; 2) inventors may retain a
non-exclusive right to use their invention in their capacity as employee; and
3) the rights to the invention may be retained by the university for
exploitation.77
The Max Planck Institute reported licensing revenues in 2003 of
DM 32 million.78 Bernhard Hertel, managing director of the Max Planck
Society’s (“MPS”) technology transfer division, says that, "[t]here is an
increasing demand from young scientists who want to start their own
companies, not only at MPS but elsewhere in Germany."79 Germany also
maintains a program called “EXIST” that promotes “networks between
universities, capital providers, and service companies to facilitate university
spinouts.”80 The EU notes that despite these efforts, there is underutilization of technology and lack of cohesive technology transfer
policies.81 The EU, however, was encouraged by Germany’s recent efforts
in 2001 including an “action scheme to promote technology transfer.”82
Germany is establishing “regional patent and commercialization agencies
which help groups of universities and non-university research institutes . . .

74

Id. at A12. The privilege law is named as such because it allowed university researchers the privilege
of taking possession of patent rights to their inventions. Id.
75
Id.
76
Kuhnen & Wacker, The so-called "university professor privilege" has been amended ahead of the
total revision of the German Employed Inventor's Act, http://www.patentfirm.de/news/feb_02_04_e.htm
(accessed April 16, 2003).
77
Rough translation provided by Cornelius A. Bobbert, attorney with Kuhnen & Wacker, Munich,
Germany. Personal communication (original on file with author).
78
Agres, supra n. 18, at ¶ 8.
79
Id.
80
The European Union, Economic Policy Committee, supra n. 57, at A11.
81
Id. This is evidenced by the reluctance of “SME”s to patent discoveries and the effect of the
“professor privilege” which has led to undercommercialization and that public institutions for research
are unprepared to exploit technology. Lack of cohesive technology transfer policy is evidenced by the
recent amendments made to their patent laws, aimed at fixing such problems.
82
Id. at A12.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol30/iss2/2

2004]

THE U.S. BAYH-DOLE ACT

223

to exploit R&D results.”83
iii.

Denmark

In 1999, Denmark enacted an amendment to its patent laws
simplifying many unresolved, murky issues regarding ownership of
property rights to inventions made in university settings.84 Furthermore,
these changes encourage “all parties to generate and exploit scientific
inventions by dividing the revenue from IPR (intellectual property)
contracts between the inventing researchers and the institutions.”85 The
EU, however, still sees areas that need improvement, including
communication.86 The EU further reports that “58 million DKK (approx. 8
million euros) over a four year period has been granted for the
implementation of the new legislation,” and the government is working on
establishing networks between institutions to aid in utilization of patent
information.87
iv.

Belgium

Belgium has two research institutions vigorously seeking and
implementing research translation opportunities for its discoveries. The
Flanders Interuniversity Institute for Biotechnology (“VIB”) and the
Belgian Bioindustries Association (“BBA”) both strive to increase their
country’s utilization of these resources. The VIB handles technology
transfer issues for “nine university departments and five associated
laboratories.”88 In 2001, the VIB submitted 29 patent requests and
increased their “active patent families” by 20% to a total of 94.89 The BBA
is focused on “[e]stablishing contacts between public research institutes and
Belgian bioindustries in order to strengthen and diversify activities of the
members as well as to stimulate collaborations.”90 Belgium also has a
program called Formation and Impetus in the field of Scientific and
Technological Research (“FIRST”) that fosters professional collaborations
between academic institutions and industry aiding researchers in
establishing new spin-offs and allowing scientists to take industry
sabbaticals for 3-6 months.91
Speaking at a recent conference, Belgium’s Erik Noteboom,

83

Id. at A11-A12. “R&D” means research and development.
Id. at A6.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Agres, supra n. 18, at ¶ 4.
89
Flanders Interuniversity Institute for Biotechnology, http://www.vib.be/ (accessed April 16, 2003).
90
Belgian Bioindustries Association, Industrial and Scientific Affairs, http://www.bbabio.be/common/bba_industrial.asp (accessed April 16, 2003).
91
The European Union, Economic Policy Committee, supra n. 57, at A32.
84

Published by eCommons, 2004

224

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:2

Principal Administrator, Commission of the European Communities,
Brussels, said:
[t]he Commission's Directorate-General for Research is
engaged in several activities intended to address the IPRrelated needs of the European research community. These
include identifying, promoting and disseminating best
practices for the use of IPR in the research & innovation
process. This covers not only issues in specific scientific
or technical sectors such as bioinformatics, but also
generic issues, like Internet-based collaborations, and the
need to clarify the rules applying to the ownership and
management of IPRs arising from publicly funded R&D
and university-industry collaborations.92
The changes taking place in Belgium in the last two years were highlighted
in an interview with Stein Larsen, acting head of the Secretariat at the
Danish Council for Research Policy. Specifically, the Secretariat said,
“[t]he new law on intellectual property rights in public research has
changed the former situation where the individual researcher owned the
IPR. Now it's up to institutions to take advantage of the IPR, to
commercialise it and make profit sharing arrangements with the individual
researchers.”93 The Secretariat expresses enthusiasm for the new changes,
but also cautions reading too much into it too quickly. He predicts there
will be continued debate surrounding the potential problems caused by the
new laws.94
In sum, the countries within this section, though attempting to enact
legislation similar in effect to the BDA, either made these moves very
recently, or the moves were not of the same magnitude as the BDA
experiment in the U.S. These countries can be considered an intermediate
data point between experimental conditions containing the variable at full
strength (introduction of the BDA) and no variable at all (no BDA
provisions). This data point, however, probably lies much closer to the
negative control than to the full strength experimental condition.
b.

Negative Control Samples:
Countries that Do Not Grant
Intellectual Property Rights to Universities
Several countries either do not notice the changes in the U.S.
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intellectual property laws and their effects, or have explicitly chosen not to
follow.95 Some countries decidedly turned the other way by granting
individual researchers even stronger rights to their inventions.96 Some of
these countries are just now beginning to heed the message of the EU
regarding how the EU feels they should handle their technology.97 Others,
with long-standing problems throughout their research systems, such as
Italy, are simply being left behind in the race to profit from translation of
government-funded intellectual property.98 The current conditions of some
of the countries are described in more detail below.99 It is apparent that
Europe is in a state of flux, wherein even some of these negative control
countries are today working hard to try to implement BDA-like legislation
and activities.100
i.

Sweden

Since 1949, Swedish intellectual property laws stipulated that
The Swedish
researchers retain all rights to their inventions.101
government, however, motivates researchers to commercialize their
inventions.102 Sweden founded Technology Link Foundations with the
goals of commercialization of university research, “lowering knowledge
search costs for firms and stimulating co-operation between SMEs in joint
projects.”103 Sweden allows universities to invest in “University Holding
Companies” and form “Patent & Exploitation Offices” in the hopes that
investment in such programs will spur translation of university research into
the private sector simply by making it easier with readily-identifiable
resources.104 The Parliamentary Committee on Research floated a proposal
that allowed universities to take charge and participate in inventions
obtained through government funded research.105 This was met, however,
with vivid criticism within the Swedish populace, indicating that enactment
of Bayh-Dole like legislation in Sweden remains a long shot, at best.106
Today, “Sweden has the highest level of research and development
expenditure per capita in the EU.”107 Its spending on R&D exceeds Japan’s
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and approaches U.S. levels.108 A full 85% of this research is carried out by
private companies.109
ii.

France

In France, it is largely unclear who owns intellectual property rights
to inventions created in state funded research institutions. The EU report
characterizes France’s universities as “relatively weak in hard sciences” and
“poorly organized to address the complex issues of patent rights.”110 There
are a few bright spots highlighted by the EU, such as state-subsidized
incubators and “technology research and innovation networks” designed to
connect university researchers with private industry for specific niches of
scientific investigation.111 The European Commission flatly concludes that
“there are no specific measures that encourage large public facilities to
benchmark their activities in technology transfer and partnership with
enterprises.”112
iii.

Italy

Italy defiantly and steadfastly continues its refusal to follow the
crowd. In 2001, Italy specifically enacted legislation to award ownership of
university research property rights to researchers.113 The European
Commission’s Trend Chart for Italy is devoid of statements regarding
technology transfer or stimulation of commercialization of university
research innovations. The report, however, outlines in detail many
administrative and cultural problems with Italy’s research system,
suggesting these issues cause Italy to lag far behind in its development of
industry.114
B.

Materials & Methods: Introducing the Bayh-Dole Act into the
U.S. Sample

The purpose of this section is to describe the variable (the BDA)
added to the test tube. To gain insight into the laws of nature and the
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2001).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
The European Union, Economic Policy Committee, supra n. 57, at A9.
111
Id.
112
European Commission, European Trend Chart on Innovation, Theme-specific Country Report:
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universe, scientists conduct experiments which yield empirical observations
from which conclusions about the world around us may be drawn. These
experiments involve several integral steps. First, the conditions under
which the experiment is performed must be carefully observed and
recorded.115 Second, the variable used to perturb the system must be well
defined. Third, the effect of the introduction of this variable into the system
must be empirically measured to a degree that allows the observer to draw
conclusions about its effect.116
The enactment of the BDA promised new sources of substantial
funding and new efficiencies of translation of scientific research into useful
application for the benefit of the public good.117 The legislative history
surrounding the enactment of the BDA is covered in great detail in other
scholarly publications.118 The goals of the BDA are many and varied.
Specifically, the “Policy and Objective” introductory section of the Act
states the following goals:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the
patent system to promote the utilization of inventions
arising from federally supported research or development;
to encourage maximum participation of small business
firms in federally supported research and development
efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial
concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit
organizations and small business firms are used in a
manner to promote free competition and enterprise
without unduly encumbering future research and
discovery; to promote the commercialization and public
availability of inventions made in the United States by
United States industry and labor; to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally
supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government
and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use
of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering
policies in this area.119
These lofty aims were effectuated by provisions enumerated in
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sections 201-212 of U.S.C., Chapter 18, Title 35.120 The Act encompasses
four basic ideals regarding government funded patentable inventions: 1) in
government funded research under contract with a private individual (or
contractor), the private individual may retain legal title to the invention, but
the government is allowed "a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable,
paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United
States any subject invention throughout the world . . . "121; 2) contractors
must notify the government of the existence of any invention made
(disclosure requirement); 3) contracting entities retaining title to inventions
must first try to manufacture the product in the U.S. and if unable to do so,
must be able to show they at least tried; and 4) the government retains
“march-in” rights that allow it to force the contractor to grant a license to
another entity if certain conditions are met.122 The government can exercise
march-in rights only under certain, limited conditions, as follows:
the Government must determine that (1) the contractor is
not taking effective steps to achieve practical application
of the invention within a reasonable time, (2) the
contractor is not reasonably satisfying national health and
safety needs, (3) the contractor is not reasonably
satisfying regulatory requirements for public use, or (4)
the contractor has not received the required permission
from the Government under the U.S. industry preference
clause before licensing.123
In simpler terms, the BDA granted universities the ability to enter
into contractual arrangements to perform research in collaboration with
private industry and to license the patented inventions discovered through
these collaborations and other federally funded research programs.
Through this Act, government institutions have the authority to collect
royalties from those with whom they enter into licensing agreements.124
The BDA, however, does not explicitly define a minimum or reasonable
royalty rate.125
Researchers working for contractors must disclose potential
inventions to the contractor’s legal counsel. Once this internal disclosure is
made, the contractor must disclose the information to the U.S. government
entity from whom it obtained the benefits of government funded
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research.126 Within two years of disclosure, the contractor must decide if
they wish to retain title to the potential invention. If the contracting party
wishes to keep the rights to the invention, it must file, within one year, a
patent application that includes a legend indicating the government funding
source of the invention.127
Income from royalties and licensing, after expenses are deducted, is
dispersed to the government researchers who provided the basic scientific
knowledge behind the invention and to the employing university to support
the research and educational mission of the institution.128 Though
universities may use this income to support graduate students with stipends,
to fund initial set-up expenses of new faculty, and to launch new research
projects, BDA provisions do not apply directly to research performed by
individuals in government laboratories funded through “scholarship[s],
fellowship[s], training grant[s], or other funding agreement made by a
Federal agency primarily to an awardee for educational purposes.”129
There is debate whether this Act represents a “normal” approach to
solving problems within the U.S. legislative history, or whether it is a
radical departure - an untested and abnormal extension of law for its time.
Some scholars feel this Act represented a “sea change” in the approach of
government towards the handling of intellectual property derived from
research funded by the U.S. government.130 Others feel the BDA
represented merely a predictable continuation of progress towards
utilization of the resources belonging to the public.131 Indeed, it is difficult
to characterize this legislation as a radical departure from previous
government legislation because the government allowed these parties to
license intellectual property between themselves for many years prior to the
BDA. Opponents of this view base their contention on a more extended
view of the history of patents and legal theory behind patent laws.132
C.

Results: Quantitative & Qualitative Data

The observations collected to date include not only empirical,
quantitative data, but also qualitative factors arising from implementation of
the BDA. Objective, accurate quantitative data is the gold standard most
often used in science.133 Many studies by necessity, however, must be
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concluded entirely on qualitative analysis of experiments (e.g. a subtle
increase in intensity of a faint signal, an increase of an unknown amount in
the size of a protein or strand of DNA, or the appearance of a detectable
signal where there previously was none). Where an event cannot be
accurately observed quantitatively, thus requiring the reliance on qualitative
data, conclusions often cannot be clear cut. Conclusions based on
qualitative data speak in generalities and trends and often aid in the
proposal of new experiments aimed at more precisely determining the
outcome.
To fully describe the U.S. sample, observations must be made from
as many angles and perspectives as possible. In this case, observations
include, for instance, the viewpoint from research scientists inside and
outside academia and government, socio-political viewpoints, historical
viewpoints, and legal viewpoints. Observations are divided into “positive”
effects and “negative” effects on the U.S. system. Normally, scientific data
is not split into these preconceived notions of “good” and “bad” because the
data must speak for itself. However, qualitative and quantitative outcomes
are divided in this way for organizational purposes.
In this experiment, the quantitative data is represented by statistics
concerning licensing and other economic numbers. Even these statistics
may be considered somewhat qualitative due to their level of accuracy.
Despite this, the quantitative data is summarized as a positive factor due to
the overall perceived positive outcomes reported. Qualitatively, there is a
fertile field of legal, scientific and political scholarly comment on both the
positive and negative facets of enactment of the BDA. Some of these
factors are also summarized.
1.

Positive Effects of the BDA

The heavy weight of impressive statistics show great benefits for
the U.S. system after introduction of the BDA. The Association of
University Technology Managers reports that at the end of fiscal year 1999,
over 21,000 licensing agreements were created.134 In addition, 2,922 new
business ventures were generated and 12,324 patent invention
disclosures.135 These new activities at universities generated a reported
$862 million in royalties for teaching hospitals and universities in fiscal
year 1999 alone.136 It is estimated that these financial benefits yield an
influx to the U.S. economy of $40.9 billion per year.137 Furthermore, it is
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estimated that the Act supports over 270,000 jobs.138 Patent issuance to
U.S. universities has increased over 10-fold since introduction of the
BDA.139 In 2000 alone, universities collected a staggering $1.26 billion in
adjusted gross income through translating government funded research into
the private market.140
The Public Health Services branch of the U.S. government is
responsible for funding scientific research through the National Institutes of
Health (“NIH”). In 2003, the NIH spent over $27 billion for research.141
The U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Committee estimates that if this
investment yields medical advances that give rise to at least a 10% increase
in longevity, U.S. citizens will realize a $240 billion return on their tax
payer investment.142 When examining a specific sector of technology
experiencing rapid acceleration of growth, such as genetic engineering, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the University of
California, and the private company Genentech were the top three patentees
between 1977 and 1997.143 In a report to Congress in 2001, the NIH made
the following remarks which shed light on the overall effect this has had on
the U.S.:
Current practices in technology transfer have yielded a
dramatic return to the taxpayer through the discovery of
new technologies that extend life and improve the quality
of life and through the development of products that,
without the successful public-private relationship, might
not be available. The transfer of federally funded
technology has also resulted in financial returns from
licensing activity, and such funds are used to buttress the
biomedical research enterprise that has made the U.S. the
world leader in this field.144
This report mentions several qualitative factors such as benefits to research,
introduction into the market of life-saving technology, and other benefits to
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the general public.
Prior to the BDA, university researchers who investigated
technologies wholly owned by private industry faced two hard decisions.
The investigator either had to pay monopoly fees to the private industry to
obtain the rights to use the material under investigation (but if large
quantities were needed, the cost could exceed the funds available for
research), or pursue the research in some other related but different field.
Today, under the BDA, private industries can partner with the university
laboratory to fund a joint project, allowing investigation and continued
discovery through basic research using the protected technology.
The AUTM FY 2000 survey lists several unique and novel
inventions brought to market and made available to the public through use
of BDA provisions.145 This provides only a mere sampling of the myriad of
potentially life-saving and life-extending technologies that have made it to
market through the BDA provisions. In fiscal year 2000 alone, 347 new
products were introduced into the market.146 It is difficult, considering the
history of under-utilization of public funded research, to make the blanket
statement that these discoveries would have yielded marketable and useful
“industrial arts” despite the passage of the BDA. Legal scholars comment
on the need for the patent system to incentivise the innovation process. The
following famous passage from Kaempffert’s writings is illustrative of this
concept:
To be sure, inventors long for wealth. So do poets. But
the patent laws are no more responsible for great
inventions than are copyright laws for great poems. Watt
was no more impelled by the desire to make money when
he invented the separate condenser than Milton was
impelled to earn the equivalent of twenty-five dollars by
writing Paradise lost.147
In this case, the investigator, Watt, certainly discovered the
condenser innovation.148 But, he also expended eleven years, and sixty man
years of labor, to perfect his product - an operational steam engine.149 It is
doubtful that Watt would have proceeded with this project without the
promise of a patent because, in order to raise capital for such ventures,
investors want some assurance that there is a possibility for recouping the
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investment. Patents afford this assurance.150
Universities are academically enriched through interaction with the
private industry. Scientific studies that may not have otherwise been
performed are now possible. Investigators are enriched through increased
interactions between fellow scientists, stimulating discussion, and thought.
The old adage still holds true today: two brains are better than one.151 Prior
to the BDA, communication was basically only one-way; research results
were on uni-dimensional trajectories where they were all abandoned to the
public domain. Now, there can be a cross-pollination in which results are
shared. This cross-talk can potentially spawn new projects. The
universities’ reputations also benefit when their scientists are courted
throughout the world for their expertise. Students at the universities benefit
by having the opportunity to gain superior training and potential advanced
placement in industry through contacts and establishment of a reputation
within specific projects. Industries benefit in many ways from these
interactions as well. “[S]uch partnerships can offer: (1) access to advanced
academic research, expertise, and prestige; and (2) opportunities for
recruiting highly-qualified students.”152
The AUTM study reveals many positive impacts on the U.S.
economy, including the creation of hundreds of thousands of new, hightechnology jobs.153 There are billions of dollars in revenue gained from
these interactions.154 Proponents of the BDA claim these moneys represent
tax payer dollars being recouped and recycled to provide even more
research results.155 The public, after all, benefits from these innovations in
many ways, including extended life and increased quality of life.156 This in
turn relieves the strain on the U.S. healthcare system, saving more tax payer
money.157
Within the biomedical field, there are other positive factors,
including time saving measures to industry and a stronger focus on research
targeted at curing disease. Pharmaceutical products developed through
collaborative studies with universities are perceived to be higher in quality
than those not developed through these collaborations.158 The autonomy
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the public university setting provides its investigators and the participation
of fellow colleagues on government review boards involved in approving
such products correlate to a greater trust in the data behind the products
seeking approval.159 Autonomous peer review of such products provides
objective safety measures assuring only safe and effective products make it
to the public.160
During the recession years of the 1980’s, the NIH began to place an
increased focus on allotting research dollars to those projects targeted to
curing specific diseases. The emphasis became more pronounced in later
years when the NIH was concerned with effectuating its mission of winning
the war against disease.161 The war against cancer became a major focus of
millions of dollars in funding. Any scientist wishing to perform basic
science162 research needed to in some way or manner link their studies to a
system involved in an important disease to ensure funding approval. This is
still true today. Private industry, whose major motivation is profit, helps
scientists to apply their research more directly to curing specific diseases by
developing specific products.
The AUTM FY 2000 survey also highlights the steady acceleration
of universities that take financial interests in start-up companies. These
start-up companies are usually based on more risky, “forward-looking
ideas” that would otherwise find it hard to establish funding.163 In 2000
alone there were 372 start-up companies reported in which universities held
equity.164 This represents a significant increase from the prior year, and the
trend is expected to continue. One report states “the amount of the
licensee's stock for early-stage life science companies is generally in the
range of 1% to 10% of the stock outstanding at the time of the license
grant” in these start-up companies.165 Investment in these start-up
companies, while appearing to be risky, can substantially benefit the public
because these “forward-looking” projects often yield large leaps in
technological innovation.166
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Negative Effects of the BDA

Scholars criticize the BDA for several reasons: potential
compromise of ethical standards in application of the scientific method and
administrative implementation of the Act itself, the potential for financial
and personal interests to conflict with use of sound research techniques, and
potential delays in publishing (because competitors need to keep their
inventions secret to maintain the competitive edge.)167 Scholars also
criticize the negative impact of motivating scientists to perform more
applied research instead of basic theoretical research, and the vulnerability
caused by the potential dependence of academia on industry.168
Other scholars posit that the BDA is really not making any money
at all. Lawyer fees in 2000 alone were $142 million.169 From 1985-1994,
the NIH collected $76 million in royalties.170 While this may appear to be a
large sum, when compared to the rest of NIH’s budget, it represents “less
than 1% of NIH’s intramural funding during this time period.”171 Careful
analysis of the $1.26 billion figure provided by AUTM, in concert with
accompanying relevant data, reveals that the universities really are not
making large profits above operating costs.172
Some critics feel that, if the U.S. thinks it needs legislation like the
BDA, then there is a basic misunderstanding of our entire intellectual
property rights system. In the past, the motivation for innovation came
from “the system of property rights which evolved in mutual dependence
with the process of economic development and change.”173 Thus, if the
government needs to provide new specific incentives to innovate, there
must be a sort-of “evolutionary deficit.”174 Defining this deficit should be
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the main focal point of remedying the problem. Perhaps the BDA is merely
acting as a “band-aid” by only treating the symptoms of the problem rather
than the deep-rooted cause itself.
Additionally, there is intense concern about U.S. citizens being
“billed twice” as they must pay through taxes for government funded
research, and then pay again for increased costs in prescription drugs due to
licensing fees passed on to the consumer through the industries engaged in
research projects with universities.175 Some argue wholesale transfer of
rights to the private sector without proper or adequate policing results in
very little royalty returns and increased costs to consumers who must now
pay monopoly prices for the goods derived from these agreements.176 The
“taxpayers must pay twice” fear is rationalized as follows: once private
industry obtains the rights to the intellectual property developed with
taxpayer funds, private industry companies owning the rights will charge
higher prices for the commercial goods stemming from these rights in order
to pay the royalty fees imposed by the BDA.177 These companies may
charge even more because they now own a monopoly. The taxpayer must
pay not only for the development of the basic research, but also for the
commercialization, royalties, and monopolistic advantages provided by the
system. The lack of oversight is argued to produce other negative
qualitative factors. Only a very small percentage of BDA patents contain
the required BDA statement regarding Government funding.178
Joshua Kalkstein, Senior Corporate Counsel-Research for Pfizer,
Inc., suggests that universities should lean more towards non-exclusive
licensing.179 He also counsels that universities have the ability to enter into
both exclusive and non-exclusive licenses simultaneously. The problem
with exclusive licenses is the licensees are viewed as hording inventions
without letting other respectable researchers utilize the technology in other
ways. This exclusivity can be a limiting problem; keeping the government
from maximizing the use of the technology it has. Kalkstein goes on to say,
“It is deplorable that some types of research tools, previously easily
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available to all, are now the subject of restrictive licensing practices.”180
The AUTM survey reports that 90% of licenses executed in 2000 were
exclusive.181
Because the information is sometimes considered proprietary, an
increase in patenting and protection of these innovations may lead to more
barriers for scientists who wish to collaborate.182 Professor Eisenberg
remarks that such withholding of information “threatens to impoverish the
public domain of research science that has long been an important resource
for researchers in both the public and private sectors.”183
Some feel the increased dependence of academia on industry ties
and private funding can make the academic system, as a whole, more
vulnerable to manipulation. Around 1924, one of the earliest criticisms of
such arrangements between private and public parties was expressed. It
was then feared that these arrangements would motivate researchers to
“work only on those ideas that appeared to have commercial potential.”184
Academic institutions pride themselves on their autonomy from politics and
favoritism. They are held up as bastions of objectivity. Scientific research
projects are directed by professors who hold tenure. Tenure affords
professors the protection to say and publish what they want and to choose
to perform research in the area of study they wish without fear of
retribution from administration, who may be motivated by other factors.
Apparently, this system is turned on its head by allowing the very
same investigators to now collaborate with private industry, whose
motivations are singular and non-objective. These interactions have the
propensity to be manipulated both at the scientific level and the
administrative level. A 1985 study showed “faculty who received industrial
support were much more likely than other biotechnology faculty to report
that their research had resulted in trade secrets and that commercial
considerations had influenced their choice of research projects.”185
Peter J. Harrington, Associate General Counsel for UMass
Memorial Health Care, describes conflicts of interest as “situations in
which financial or other personal considerations may compromise, or have
the appearance of compromising, an investigator's professional judgment in
conducting or reporting research.”186 Harrington further summarizes the
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potential conflicts of interest into three general categories: (1) potential for
private industry collaborator to manipulate the academic scientist’s
objective choice of “technical approach” (types of experiments chosen to
complete the project); (2) potential for proprietary concerns to effect the
academic scientist’s natural need for free and open discussion of the data,
not only with the rest of the scientific community, but also with their own
students and other laboratory personnel; and (3) potential for the industrial
sponsor to further influence the academic scientist’s “choice of, or approach
to, future research.”187 Additionally, conflicts of interest arise when
university scientists stand to gain financially from the research project
depending on the outcome of the experiments.188
Other conflicts include conflicts of personal time management of
the academic researcher. Professors are in involved in a myriad of duties
including teaching, tutoring graduate students, overseeing as many as a
dozen research projects, committee commitments, and responsibilities of
obtaining funding. Adding the extra dimension of overseeing privatelyfunded research to all these responsibilities may be too burdensome for
some, requiring them to neglect one or more of their other duties to the
university system.189 The potential loss of objectivity so carefully guarded
by the academic institution is the ultimate sacrifice arising from potential
conflict of interest issues.190 This loss in perceived objectivity may cause
the general public to discontinue its belief in the results of academic
research and cause reluctance to follow advice arising from research results.
Additionally, there is fear that collaborations between private and public
parties will result in delayed publishing of scientific research results or even
withholding of these results entirely.
Finally, there are those that proclaim the many rules and
regulations stipulated by the BDA and its attending regulatory statutes are
too burdensome for private industry and actually effectuate the opposite of
its intention. These regulations, while well-defined, are set in stone and
non-negotiable.191 Contracts derived from the BDA provisions require time
for execution and layers of government administrative approval to process.
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DISCUSSION

Determination of the effect of the BDA on the U.S. requires a
balancing of the goods it hoped to accomplish against the evils it may
cause. This experiment is not designed well enough to yield a clear cut, yes
or no, conclusion. Thus, the conclusion must be based on something less
than quantitative and, instead, will depend on the weight each individual
person places on various aspects of the factors involved. Moreover, the
power and dominance of the U.S. in certain technology markets brought
about through the contributions of the BDA is associated with many
benefits that can be difficult to assess.
Quantitative conclusions from a comparison of the negative control
samples with the experimental sample (U.S.) are somewhat more clear cut.
The numbers reveal a stark contrast in research economies. The two largest
licensing/royalty income powerhouses in U.S. academia are Columbia
University and the University of California. These two institutions alone
brought in $400 million in royalties and licensing deals in 2000, according
to the Association of University Technology Managers Licensing Survey.192
The average U.S. academic institution brought in about $4 million in the
same year.193 In contrast, no European academic institution brought in
more than $2 million.194 Compared with over 12,000 patent disclosures in
1999 for U.S. universities, European counterparts will patent approximately
six or seven inventions per year per institution.195
Yet, direct comparisons between negative European sample
countries and the U.S. are hard to make due to the differences in funding
between the two regions. For instance, the European Union has
approximately 3300 universities, whereas the U.S. has over 4000.196 In the
U.S., 550 of these universities issue doctorates, 125 are “research
universities, and 50 “account for the lion’s share of American academic
research capacity, public funding in support of university research and the
country’s Nobel prizes for science.”197 The U.S. investment in higher
education amounts to roughly 2.3% of its GDP, whereas the European
Union only spends 1.1%.198 The EU chalks this up to lack of private
funding (0.2% in EU, 1.2% in USA).199 Half of the European citizens who
attend school in the U.S. stay for several years, but many of them do not
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return.200 “[T]he budget for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 2001
is 50 times the amount the EU is planning in its Framework Programme for
biomedical research for the next 5 years.”201
On average, though several countries seem to be well on their way
to optimizing the use of their research innovation rewards, these countries’
new legislation and approaches still have “complicated and limited the
transfer of technology and transnational cooperation.”202 Europe may not
be able to fix these problems very quickly. Some countries are enacting
BDA-like legislation, but the legislation is too diverse, sporadic, and
imprecise to allow for the full effect observed in the U.S.203 Furthermore,
“European universities generally have less to offer and lower financial
resources than their equivalents in the other developed countries,
particularly the USA.”204 The infrastructure needed to capitalize on
research results from universities and other government institutions does
not appear to be at the required level of competency needed to make
investing worthwhile.205 Europe is finally beginning to realize that,
“[t]hrowing knowledge over university walls and hoping for the best is not
now perceived as sufficient to encourage the application of that knowledge
for economic and social benefit.”206 The European Commission states,
“[f]rom a competitiveness perspective it is vital that knowledge flows from
universities into business and society.”207 AUTM reports that international
membership is increasing at a pace faster than any other membership
segment.208
There are scholars who downplay the overall effect the BDA has
had on the U.S. These scholars contend federally funded research can be
harvested without the enactment of the new legislation.209 Further, these
scholars propose that the enormous financial gains are due to increases in
government funding of basic biomedical research starting in the 1960’s, a
shift to a more favorable disposition towards patent rights in the judicial
system, legislative action to strengthen intellectual property rights, and
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government efforts to push for favorable intellectual protection overseas.210
As the debate simmers, with proponents and opponents staunchly
entrenched in their own beliefs and fears about whether or not the BDA
approach is good for the U.S., the rest of the world is apparently taking
notice. Why? Because financially, there is so much at stake. Almost as a
mirror to the public debate about the evils and benefits of the Act, European
countries and others are enacting or have already enacted legislation that
either parallels, or contradicts the BDA. Kerry Capell, in a recent article in
Business Week, aptly summarizes some of the worst fears of some
European countries by placing in stark contrast the following facts: (1)
Novartis, a large pharmaceutical company in Switzerland, announced that it
is building a new research and development center in Cambridge, MA to
the tune of $250 million; and (2) a day later the European Commission
released “a damning report on the state of the European drug industry.”211
In widely cited and well-known - but still frightening - statistics, it is
maintained that European investment in overseas R&D catapulted from
27% in 1990 to 41% in 1999.212 Capell states nobody is really surprised by
the European Commission’s conclusions.213 She cites senior vice-president
of Cambridge Pharma Consultancy, Barrie James, as saying, “[y]ou can
almost hear the sucking sound as all the money goes across the pond . . .
.”214 Investments in pharmaceuticals, in particular, doubled parallel
investments in Europe (e.g. investments during the 1990’s increased by five
fold in the U.S., but only half that rate in Europe).215
Qualitatively, however, there appear to be some very crucial
negative factors to resolve. Concern about publishing, though, may not be
as troubling as it first appears. Private industry also has a motivation to
publish early and publish often. Private companies do this to provide
“market signaling” strategies which help to attract top level scientists, alert
competitors regarding the areas the company is going into, and to gain
respect from competitors and peers. In Europe, a recent study showed
“only a small fraction of researchers and organizations [who] actually
experience a considerable delay in publication of research results that are
the subject of a patent application . . . .”216 Investigators at universities
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publish their results in peer-reviewed journals. There already exists a builtin publication delay in the current research system. Furthermore, academic
investigators must regularly make decisions regarding which research to
place in peer-reviewed manuscripts and when to submit these manuscripts
for publication. Delays in publication may be caused by any number of
reasons, not the least of which is the desire to withhold research results for
the purpose of trumping other academic competitors by publishing the most
groundbreaking results first. A recent review reports that “there have been
very few documented cases of important collaborative research results
being held in secret to the detriment of the academy or the public-atlarge.”217
The potential manipulation of the academic research community is
a frightening prospect. However, “although industry support of university
research has been increasing rapidly in recent years, it still amounts to just
seven percent of all university R&D expenditures.”218 Furthermore,
academic scientists already have financial incentives in place that give them
potentially conflicting motivations in the laboratory. In order to be
successful, investigators require funding. Funding is most often obtained
through grants from the government or non-profit organizations. The best
way to assure continued funding for research projects and continued
employment is to show successful results in the laboratory. These financial
incentives have been in place since the government began funding research
in 1950.219
The taxpayer penalty on royalties is also a significant negative
detractor from proponents of the BDA. It may help to consider, however,
who pays this extra “tax.” For instance, if a new drug is developed to fight
a specific disease through collaboration between government and private
industry, the people buying these new drugs are those that most directly
benefit from the research. Therefore, although the tax on the public may
appear burdensome, it is a very specific and targeted tax.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At a minimum, the translation of academic, publicly funded
research into commercial applications is a very important issue to our U.S.
economy. The survey of countries included in this report is representative
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of issues being debated and actions being taken by countries across the
globe. There is no doubt that in the near future, every country will be
forced to reconsider their intellectual property laws and how they either
hinder or enable competition with the U.S. market. Foreign nations see this
type of legislation as the extra incentive their country needs to better
compete with their neighbors and the U.S. in the global economy.220 If
nations like Germany, the UK, and Denmark continue to lag behind in
commercialization of research innovations, they must consider whether
altering the patent rights regime between researcher and institution was not
the path to take.
Could so many countries seeking to follow the U.S., and so many
people debating this national experiment, be so incorrect about the apparent
positive effects the BDA has had on the U.S. research economy? In
weighing the potential benefits to a country’s economy - both in terms of
jobs and property - against the potential negative side-effects, the consensus
is very clear: most countries are choosing to follow in the Bayh-Dole Act’s
footsteps, importing the Bayh-Dole Act for its perceived positive impact on
the economy.
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